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SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE JOB MARKET: HOW TO
RECONCILE APPLICANT PRIVACY WITH EMPLOYER NEEDS
Peter B. Baumhart*
In the modern technological age, social media allows us to communicate vast
amounts of personal information to countless people instantaneously. This infor-
mation is valuable to more than just our “friends” and “followers,” however.
Prospective employers can use this personal data to inform hiring decisions, thereby
maximizing fit and minimizing potential liability. The question then arises, how
best to acquire this information? For job applicants, the counter-question is how
best to protect the privacy of their social media accounts. As these two competing
desires begin to clash, it is important to find a method to mediate the conflict.
Existing privacy law, whether rooted in constitutional, statutory, or common law,
is insufficient to cope with the practice, and pending legislation also fails to ade-
quately account for the legitimate interests of both parties. This Note advocates a
novel solution: a modified information escrow that would provide employers with
the relevant information they seek while keeping private the substantive content of
applicants’ social media accounts.
INTRODUCTION
When people tweet, upload pictures, or post status updates, they
are not likely thinking about the long-term effects of those actions.
We live in an age, however, of near-instantaneous communication
accompanied by the capacity to indefinitely store electronically
transmitted data; those effects are real and have the potential for
serious and unanticipated consequences down the road. In particu-
lar, social media activity is increasingly becoming an object of
interest to employers, who are attempting to expand the pool of
information from which they can learn about potential employees.
This Note explores the developing employer practice of request-
ing or requiring that applicants provide access to the private
information located on their social media accounts.  In doing so,
this Note acknowledges the legitimate interests of each party to the
hiring decision—the applicant and the employer—and seeks to ar-
ticulate a solution that accommodates the needs of each. Part I will
explain the practice at issue and examine the problems that neces-
sarily arise. Part II will canvass the state of the law as it pertains (or
* J.D. Candidate (2015), University of Michigan Law School. The author would like to
thank Emily Brown, M. Jeanette Pitts, and Michael Powers for their helpful feedback and
suggestions. The author would especially like to thank Professor J.J. Prescott, whose guidance
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might pertain) to the problems raised in Part I. Part III will describe
the shortcomings of the current law and present an alternative solu-
tion: a modified information escrow that recalibrates the budget of
available information between the applicant and the employer to
maximize the net payoff for both parties.
I. EMPLOYERS, APPLICANTS, AND SOCIAL MEDIA
The use of social networking sites (SNSs) is more popular than
ever, with over sixty-seven percent of Internet users having some
form of social media presence.1 Facebook alone had 1.32 billion
active monthly users at the end of June 2014.2 But by posting per-
sonal information online, SNS users risk communicating that
information to more than just their friends—tweets, status updates,
pictures, and the like can provide a veritable treasure chest of infor-
mation to teachers, co-workers, strangers, and, most importantly for
this Note, potential employers. Although statistics regarding the fre-
quency with which employers actually look at an applicant’s SNS
profiles vary widely,3 the trend is unquestionable, indicating that an
applicant’s SNS account content appears to be fair game for em-
ployers. This may not seem so troubling when the prospective
employer is simply viewing information that the applicant has made
public; some employers, however, are demanding applicants’ pass-
words to view otherwise unavailable, private information.4 In today’s
1. MAEVE DUGGAN & JOANNA BRENNER, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF SO-
CIAL MEDIA USERS – 2012 3 (2012), available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/
Reports/2013/PIP_SocialMediaUsers.pdf. Compare id. (showing social media use by age as
eighty-nine percent of users ages eighteen to twenty nine, seventy-seven percent of users ages
thirty to forty-nine, fifty-two percent of users fifty to sixty-four, and thirty-two percent of users
sixty-five and older), with AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA & MO-
BILE INTERNET USE AMONG TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 17 (2010), available at http://web.pewin
ternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Social_Media_and_Young_Adults_Report_Fi
nal_with_toplines.pdf  (indicating that social media use by Internet users  was seventy-two
percent of users ages eighteen to twenty-nine and forty percent of users age thirty and older
in 2009).
2. Company Info, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Oct.
8, 2014).
3. The research on this statistic shows frequency of use ranging from approximately
forty percent of employers to over ninety percent of employers. Compare Mary Lorenz, Two in
Five Employers Use Social Media to Screen Candidates, CAREERBUILDER (July 1, 2013), http://
thehiringsite.careerbuilder.com/2013/07/01/two-in-five-employers-use-social-media-to-
screen-candidates/ (claiming that thirty-nine percent of employers use social media to screen
applicants), with JOBVITE, 2013 SOCIAL RECRUITING SURVEY RESULTS 8 (2013), available at http:/
/web.jobvite.com/rs/jobvite/images/Jobvite_2013_SocialRecruitingSurveyResults. pdf
(claiming that ninety-three percent of recruiters are likely to use an applicant’s SNS profile).
4. See, e.g., Mark B. Gerano, Note, Access Denied: An Analysis of Social Media Password
Demands in the Public Employment Setting, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 665, 672–73 (2013) (describing the
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competitive job market, applicants may not be in a position to
refuse.5
A. Social Networking Sites (SNSs): Content and Use
The term “social networking” or “social media” encompasses a
wide range of websites, among them Facebook, Twitter, and In-
stagram. Though the specific functions and capabilities of these
sites may differ, at its core a social networking site is “a website that
is designed to help people communicate and share information,
photographs, etc. within a group.”6 Through accounts on various
SNSs, users are able to connect with friends, receive updates on
local and global events, and communicate thoughts and beliefs with
others.7 One of the most common features of SNSs is the user’s
profile, an individual’s unique webpage where the user can post
personal details (e.g., age, sex, place of residence) and share photo-
graphs, messages, and other such information.8 For example, a
standard Facebook profile allows a user to share “posts,” photos,
apps, and the like, all in the name of expressing “who [the user is]
through all the things [she does].”9
As users post ever-increasing amounts of personal information
online, the risk that an unauthorized party may access damaging
information increases. Once it is posted online, anyone able to ac-
cess a user’s information can download it, including search engines
that simply store the information indefinitely.10 Thus, deleting in-
formation from an SNS account does not necessarily purge that
Maryland Department of Corrections’ 2011 policy of requiring prison guard applicants to
provide their SNS passwords to the Department). But see Shel Israel, The Great Facebook Em-
ployee Password Non-Issue, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2012, 8:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
shelisrael/2012/03/25/the-great-facebook-employee-password-nonissue/ (arguing that the
frequency with which employers actually require disclosure of SNS account passwords has
been overstated).
5. Shannon Mcfarland, Job Seekers Getting Asked for Facebook Passwords, USA TODAY (Mar.
21, 2012, 10:56 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-03-20/job-ap
plicants-facebook/53665606/1 (“[J]ob applicants are confronting [requests to provide access
to their SNS profiles], and some of them cannot afford to say no.”).
6. Social Networking Site Definition, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE, http://dictionary
.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/business-english/social-networking-site (last visited Oct. 8,
2013).
7. Company Info, supra note 2.
8. See Ian Byrnside, Note, Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Us-
ing Social Networking Sites to Research Applicants, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 445, 453 (2008).
9. Introducing Timeline, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/timeline (last vis-
ited Nov. 9, 2013).
10. See Information Is Permanent, IKEEPSAFE, http://www.ikeepsafe.org/be-a-pro/reputa
tion/information-is-permanent/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2014).
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information completely. Oftentimes, though, users will be able to
control access to their information using the SNS’s privacy set-
tings.11 For instance, Facebook users can decide who views the
content of their profiles on a case-by-case basis (i.e., every time they
post something, users can select the audience who will be able to
view that content).12 But users may be overestimating the privacy
protection that such controls actually provide: combining the po-
tential permanency of downloadable online content with
complicated procedures to set privacy controls could mean that
“private” information is actually quite public.13
SNSs are different both in degree and in kind from previous
communication technologies. No prior technology was capable of
the instantaneous and mass communication that SNSs offer, and
the information that SNSs convey is susceptible to surveillance and
permanent storage in ways previously unimagined.14 In short, SNS
users are able to communicate more information to more people
but have less hope of defending that information from prying eyes.
Thus far, the long-term privacy impacts are undetermined. The very
fact that such vast quantities of personal information are so easily
accessible may increase the perceived imperative for certain enti-
ties, such as employers, to monitor (potential) employees’ SNS use
to avoid future liability.15 Moreover, the increasing ubiquity of SNSs
makes it impractical not to have some sort of social media presence.
Any impingement on the privacy of online information will, there-
fore, necessarily affect a considerable segment of the population.
Hence, the developing employer practice of requesting access to
job applicants’ SNS accounts could have far-reaching implications,
especially as those who have grown up using SNSs begin to enter
the workforce en masse.
11. Byrnside, supra note 8, at 453–54; see also Lindsay S. Feuer, Note, Who is Poking
Around Your Facebook Profile?: The Need to Reform the Stored Communications Act to Reflect a Lack of
Privacy on Social Networking Websites, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 473, 485–87 (2011) (describing
Facebook’s privacy settings); Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/full_data
_use_policy (last updated Nov. 15, 2013).
12. Data Use Policy, supra note 11.
13. See Nathan J. Ebnet, Note, It Can Do More than Protect Your Credit Score: Regulating
Social Media Pre-Employment Screening with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 97 MINN. L. REV. 306,
316–17 (2012); Feuer, supra note 11, at 487; Data Use Policy, supra note 11 (indicating that
some information, including the user’s name, profile picture, and gender, is “always public”).
14. See Saby Ghoshray, Employer Surveillance Versus Employee Privacy: The New Reality of So-
cial Media and Workplace Privacy, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 593, 597 (2013) (comparing SNSs to
telephones).
15. See id. at 597 (“[E]ase of instant communication and access to its stored content
within social media may provide [a] stronger rationale for surveillance.”).
WINTER 2015] Social Media and the Job Market 507
B. Employers’ Pre-Screening Use of SNSs: Reasons and Risks
When making hiring decisions, employers use a variety of tools
such as re´sume´s, references, and interviews. In recent years, em-
ployers have also made use of online searches to vet applicants.16
The next logical step is investigating applicants’ SNS accounts,
which some employers are already doing.17 If the employer is lim-
ited to only the information that an applicant has made publicly
available on an SNS, then there would be little to distinguish from a
standard online search. Moreover, an applicant cannot reasonably
expect that information made publicly available will remain pro-
tected from anyone, including prospective employers.18 A more
invasive practice appears to be emerging, however: requesting ac-
cess to the applicant’s private SNS account information.19
An employer can gain access to an applicant’s SNS accounts in
several ways: (1) the employer may directly ask the applicant to turn
over her password20 or log the employer in to her account; (2) the
employer may request that the applicant add the employer’s (or an
agent’s) SNS account as a contact, or “friend,” to allow the em-
ployer to see the applicant’s SNS account content; or (3) the
employer may use more surreptitious means, such as requesting an
authorized viewer of the applicant’s SNS content to share that con-
tent with the employer.21 Though the method of gaining access may
make a difference regarding the amount of private information the
employer is able to acquire,22 any of these methods will usually pro-
vide the employer with more private information than would be
otherwise available.
16. Allan Hoffman, Job Applicant, Beware: You’re Being Googled, MONSTER.COM, http://ca
reer-advice.monster.com/job-search/getting-started/hr-googling-job-applicants/article.aspx
(last visited Oct. 8, 2014) (describing that, as early as 2006, seventy-seven percent of employ-
ers were using online search engines to research applicants).
17. See Lorenz, supra note 3.
18. See Hoffman, supra note 16.
19. See Sara Gates, CISPA Amendment Banning Employers from Asking for Facebook Passwords
Blocked, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 21, 2013, 9:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/
04/21/cispa-amendment-facebook-passwords-blocked_n_3128507.html (discussing the de-
feat of an amendment to the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act that would have
banned employers from requesting SNS account passwords); Resume, Cover Letter, and Your
Facebook Password?, NPR (Mar. 21, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/21/149091
139/resume-cover-letter-and-your-facebook-password (interview with Robert Collins, an ap-
plicant to the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Corrections who had to provide his
SNS account password as part of his application).
20. E.g., Resume, Cover Letter, and Your Facebook Password?, supra note 19.
21. See, e.g., Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Group, No. 06-5754, 2008 WL 6085437, at *1
(D.N.J. July 25, 2008).
22. Using Facebook messages as an example, only the account user and the recipient of
a message will be able to view a user’s Facebook messages. Who Can See My Messages?,
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While accessing an applicant’s SNS account may seem to be an
unwarranted invasion of privacy, there are many incentives for an
employer to conduct as thorough a pre-screening process as possi-
ble. Pre-employment screening can result in better employees (in
terms of productivity, honesty, and turnover rate),23 reduced non-
violent employee misconduct,24 and a reduced risk of negligent hir-
ing liability.25 Certain employers also have to consider whether an
applicant can be trusted with sensitive information or trade
secrets,26 and looking at the applicant’s SNS account can provide
insight into the type of information that the applicant tends to post
online. At the most basic level, pre-employment screening helps to
ensure that the applicant “appears professional and will fit in with
company culture.”27 Applicants’ SNS accounts would seem to be
highly relevant to this analysis, considering that one of the major
purposes of SNSs is to enable the user to “express who [she is].”28
Moreover, SNSs are a cost-effective pre-screening tool—searches
can be conducted quickly and in-house.29
SNSs can be a powerful pre-screening resource, but employer use
of such information also carries certain risks. Applicants’ SNS ac-
counts often contain information that employers are forbidden
from considering when making hiring decisions, such as  age, race,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/www/212388195458335?rdrhc (last visited Oct.
8, 2014).  Thus, an employer would only be able to view an applicant’s messages through
direct access to the applicant’s account, but not by adding the applicant as a “friend” or any
of the other methods.
23. ALAN KINSEY, INQUIREHIRE, THE BENEFITS OF PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING 2 (n.d.),
available at http://www.sweeneyinc.com/files/benefits_preemployment_screening.pdf (last
visited Nov. 9, 2013). Inquirehire is a consulting firm that offers hiring solutions for business,
government, and non-profit organizations.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id. at 3–4; see also Alissa Del Riego et al., Your Password or Your Paycheck?: A Job Appli-
cant’s Murky Right to Social Media Privacy, 16 J. INTERNET L. 1, 18 & n.9 (2012).
26. See Alexander Naito, Comment, A Fourth Amendment Status Update: Applying Constitu-
tional Privacy Protection to Employees’ Social Media Use, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 849, 863 (2012); see
also Ghoshray, supra note 14, at 593–94 (discussing a hypothetical situation where an em-
ployee posts trade secrets on an SNS).
27. Leslie Kwoh, Beware: Potential Employers are Watching You, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443759504577631410093879278.
28. Introducing Timeline, supra note 9; see also Getting Started with Twitter, TWITTER, https://
support.twitter.com/groups/50-welcome-to-twitter/topics/204-the-basics/articles/215585-
getting-started-with-twitter# (last visited Oct. 8, 2014) (explaining that one of the purposes of
Twitter is to help users “find [their] own voice and show others what [they] care about”).
29. Ebnet, supra note 13, at 319 (describing how, in contrast to criminal history back-
ground checks or credit reports, an employer need not use a third-party reporting company
to research an applicant’s social media history).
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and sex.30 Employer access to such information could lead to dis-
crimination claims if the applicant is not hired. Requiring that
applicants disclose password information will also likely violate the
SNS’s terms of service,31 which could expose both the applicant and
the employer to liability.32 Because of the nature of SNSs (i.e., that
the user is selectively creating an online persona), the information
contained therein is also highly susceptible to concerns regarding
accuracy and authenticity.33 Additionally, requesting access to an
applicant’s private SNS content could foster an environment of dis-
trust and create tension between the applicant and the employer
that persists after an employee is hired.34
A recent poll indicates approximately forty percent of employers
research applicants’ SNS accounts as part of employment pre-
screening,35 up from about twenty-seven percent in 2006.36 As long
as SNSs remain popular among applicants, it is fair to believe that
employers will continue to utilize them in the pre-screening pro-
cess. Requesting access to private content on applicants’ SNS
accounts will allow employers to maximize the amount of informa-
tion available, and it appears applicants can do very little to resist if
they hope to be hired.37 In a competitive market, many applicants
30. Byrnside, supra note 8, at 462–63; see also Kwoh, supra note 27 (“By going online,
employers expose themselves to all kinds of information that cannot be legally considered in
the hiring process, such as religion, gender, and health status.”) (quoting Max Drucker, CEO
Of Social Intelligence Corporation, a business which screens job applicants on behalf of
employers).
31. Facebook officials have already taken a stand on this issue, indicating that requiring
a job applicant to disclose her password constitutes a violation of the site’s terms of service.
See Erin Egan, Chief Privacy Officer, Protecting Your Passwords and Privacy, FACEBOOK (Mar. 23,
2012, 8:32 AM), http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=326598317390057 (“As a user,
you shouldn’t be forced to share your private information and communications just to get a
job. . . . That’s why we’ve made it a violation of Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsi-
bilities to share or solicit a Facebook password.”).
32. See id. (stating that Facebook will “take action to protect the privacy and security of
[its] users . . . by initiating legal action”); Byrnside, supra note 8, at 468 (discussing potential
employer liability under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act resulting from violation of SNS
terms of service).
33. Byrnside, supra note 8, at 470–71; see also Saby Ghoshray, The Emerging Reality of Social
Media: Erosion of Individual Privacy Through Cyber-Vetting and the Law’s Inability to Catch Up, 12 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 551, 562 (2013) (“[S]ocial networking sites may contain a
wide range of information, digital exchanges, personal musings, and retorts that a potential
screener may take out of context.”).
34. See Scott Brutocao, Issue Spotting: The Multitude of Ways Social Media Impacts Employment
Law and Litigation, 60 THE ADVOCATE (TEX.) 8, 10 (2012) (“[E]mployees do not like per-
ceived intrusions on their privacy.”).
35. Lorenz, supra note 3.
36. Byrnside, supra note 8, at 457 (reporting a poll conducted by the National Associa-
tion of Colleges and Employers that surveyed 254 employers).
37. See, e.g., Mcfarland, supra note 5.
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cannot afford to take themselves out of the running for a job, even
if they would prefer not to share such private information.
Ultimately, in an effort to obtain as much pertinent information
as possible, employers may request (indeed, some already do) ac-
cess to the private content of applicants’ SNS accounts. In the
absence of legal protections, applicants have few options other than
to capitulate to such requests. Part II will examine the current state
of the law and whether any such protections exist.
II. SQUARE PEG, ROUND HOLE: SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE LAW
The law has had a difficult time adapting to the advent of SNSs.
This in turn, has created significant confusion surrounding issues
like employers’ requests for access to applicants’ SNS accounts.
Critics of this practice have proposed several solutions, includ-
ing extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment to cover
public employees’ SNS accounts,38 reforming federal legislation
such as the Stored Communications Act,39 or mandating third-party
searches to bring them under the aegis of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act.40 Congress has considered several proposals that would ban
employers from requesting applicants’ SNS account passwords,41
but has yet to pass legislation on the subject. On the other hand,
several state legislatures have enacted laws barring the practice,42
but such legislation remains relatively rare.43 Even where it exists,
this legislation fails to adequately address the issue because it bans
the practice outright, thereby ignoring employers’ legitimate inter-
ests in acquiring certain information contained on applicants’ SNS
accounts. Constitutional and common law protections are also in-
sufficient to cope with this practice.44 This Part will explore the state
38. Naito, supra note 26, at 854.
39. Feuer, supra note 11, at 476.
40. Ebnet, supra note 13, at 309.
41. E.g., Social Networking Online Protection Act, H.R. 537, 113th Cong. (2013) (cur-
rently referred to committee); Password Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 2077, 113th Cong.
(2013).
42. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124 (2013). See also infra Part II.B.2.
43. Only sixteen states have enacted legislation that prohibits employers from request-
ing access to applicants’ or employees’ private SNS account information. See Employer Access to
Social Media Usernames and Passwords: 2012 Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLA-
TURES (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords.aspx (stating that six states enacted
such legislation in 2012); Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords 2013, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-
and-information-technology/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx (last up-
dated Sept. 28, 2014) (stating that ten states enacted such legislation in 2013).
44. See infra Part II.A.
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of the law as it exists and demonstrate that SNSs fit uncomfortably
into a legal framework that is struggling to keep pace with the
times.
A. Constitutional and Common Law Privacy
The state of the law regarding privacy in the employer-applicant
relationship is far from settled. As it stands, some courts have ruled
that applicants enjoy the same expectation of privacy as their em-
ployee counterparts.45 Far more common, however, is the notion
that applicants are entitled to a diminished expectation of privacy
as compared to employees.46 The best-case scenario for an appli-
cant’s right to SNS account privacy can thus be determined by
examining an employee’s right to the same. Existing privacy law
does not adequately protect even an employee’s SNS information
from an employer’s review; therefore, an applicant also cannot
claim that the practice of requesting access to the applicant’s SNS
account violates a privacy right.
Both the common law, through an intrusion on seclusion
claim,47 and the United States Constitution, through the Fourth
Amendment,48 provide protection to public employees, while only
the common law protects the privacy of private employees. In either
circumstance, the employee must demonstrate that she has a
45. See, e.g., Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 83–85 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (“Our review . . . satisfies us that the voters did not intend to grant less privacy protec-
tion to job applicants than to employees.”). Soroka has no precedential value, however,
because the parties settled out of court, and the case was subsequently dismissed as moot.
Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 862 P.2d 148 (Cal. 1993).  In any event, this part of Soroka,
while not explicitly overruled, is likely dead in light of Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200,
1222 (Cal. 1997), which held that “drug testing of all job applicants is constitutionally permis-
sible under the Fourth Amendment even though similar drug testing of current employees
seeking promotion is not.” See also Georgia Ass’n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110,
1113–15 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (applying precedent based on privacy expectations of employees to
applicants).
46. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 203 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (“Any individual who chooses to seek employment necessarily also chooses to disclose
certain personal information to prospective employers . . . and to allow the prospective em-
ployer to verify that information.”).  It should be noted that both Soroka and Wilkinson rested
on interpretations of California’s state constitution, which contains an express right to pri-
vacy. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (articulating the “intrusion on
seclusion” invasion of privacy tort).
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches con-
ducted by private parties, such as private employers. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649,
656 (1980).
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reasonable expectation of privacy.49 If the court finds that a public
employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy, it must then de-
termine whether the employer’s search was reasonable.50 For an
employee to prevail upon an intrusion on seclusion claim, the em-
ployee must demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in
addition to an objectively reasonable expectation.51 The employee
must also show that the intrusion would be “highly offensive to a
reasonable person.”52
1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Supreme Court has not yet spoken to the issue of whether
the Fourth Amendment grants employees a reasonable expectation
of privacy in SNS accounts. The Court has, however, examined
whether employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in ar-
guably related areas. In O’Connor v. Ortega, a Fourth Amendment
case, the Supreme Court relied on two alternative tests to deter-
mine whether an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy
from a state employer in his personal office. The first test, articu-
lated in the plurality opinion, determines the employee’s privacy
expectation “in the context of the employment relation.”53 That is,
the plurality test requires a “case-by-case” assessment of whether the
area in which a privacy expectation is claimed is “so open to fellow
employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasona-
ble.”54 The second test, posited by the concurrence, would simply
apply Fourth Amendment protections to all government offices “as
a general matter.”55 In other words, the concurrence would find
that employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
offices as a general rule.
49. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (“[A]pplication of the Fourth Amend-
ment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a
‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by government
action.”); Kline v. Security Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 260 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that the
intrusion on seclusion cause of action “requires that the plaintiff have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy”); see also In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257–58 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (adapting the reasonable expectation of privacy test established in O’Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), to the private employment context).
50. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 719–20.
51. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 812–13 (9th
Cir. 2002).  Because the subjective expectation element turns simply on whether the em-
ployee had an expectation of privacy in fact, this Note will not examine it in detail.
52. Id. at 812.
53. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717.
54. Id. at 718.
55. Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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In the most recent case addressing the issue of employee expec-
tations of privacy, dealing with personal text messages sent from an
employer-issued pager, the Supreme Court declined to clarify
which test controls.56 Instead, the Court assumed that the employee
had a reasonable expectation of privacy against his public employer
under either test before  inquiring as to the reasonableness of the
employer’s invasion of that privacy expectation.57 The Court ex-
pressly avoided passing judgment concerning employees’ privacy
expectations regarding electronic communications,58 thus provid-
ing minimal guidance for analyzing the question of SNS accounts.
By assuming that the employee had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, the Court also avoided the fact that the O’Connor tests are
poorly suited to issues of cyber-privacy: the focus on a physical space
(e.g., an office) and third-party incursions therein does not trans-
late well into the ethereal realm of the Internet.59
There are several factors to consider when assessing the reasona-
bleness of a privacy expectation. One such factor is the legality of
the search at issue.60 According to the Department of Justice, it is a
federal crime to access an individual’s SNS account in violation of
the SNS’s terms of service.61 Requiring an applicant to disclose an
SNS account password constitutes such a violation;62 however, the
DOJ has indicated that it will not prosecute these offenses.63 Conse-
quently, it is not clear exactly what effect this factor will have on the
reasonableness of privacy expectations in SNS accounts. In addition
to legality, employer policies play an important role in determining
the reasonableness of privacy expectations. Employees cannot have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic communications if
56. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 756 (2010).
57. Id. at 759–60.
58. Id. at 757–60.
59. See Del Riego et al., supra note 25, at 18 (discussing the obsolescence of American
privacy law in the digital realm); Naito, supra note 26, at 872–73 (same).
60. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989).  In Riley, the police conducted a
helicopter flyover of the defendant’s property, during which they observed a marijuana
greenhouse.  The Court held that this flyover did not constitute a search because the defen-
dant “could not reasonably have expected that his greenhouse was protected from public or
official observation from a helicopter had it been flying within the navigable airspace for
fixed-wing aircraft.” Id.  The Court also noted that it would be “a different case if flying at
that altitude had been contrary to law or regulation.” Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
61. Mcfarland, supra note 5.
62. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also Revealed: How Colleges and Employers
Ask for Candidates’ Facebook and Email Passwords During Job Interviews, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 6, 2012,
12:14 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2111059/Colleges-jobs-asking-
Facebook-email-passwords-job-interviews.html?ito=feeds-newsxml (discussing a Facebook
spokesman’s comments that Facebook “prohibit[s] anyone from soliciting the login informa-
tion or accessing an account belonging to someone else”).
63. Mcfarland, supra note 5.
514 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 48:2
it is the employer’s policy to monitor such communications64 and
the employee has notice of the policy.65 Whether the communica-
tions occurred through channels furnished by the employer is also
relevant to the privacy analysis, with courts routinely holding that
employees can have no reasonable expectation of privacy in such
channels.66 Finally, if an employee has given her employer access to
an SNS account, it may also be important whether the employee
provided the access freely or whether the access was coerced.67
Lower courts have struggled when deciding whether SNS users
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their accounts. Some
courts, focusing on factors such as exposure of the information to
the public, or even to a large group of privately-selected followers,
have found that such information cannot be considered private.68
Other courts, relying instead on steps taken to limit third-party ac-
cess to SNS content, have found that employees can plausibly claim
a reasonable expectation of privacy in that content.69 Decisions re-
garding the discoverability of information on SNS accounts also fall
on both sides of the line,70 illustrating the difficulties that courts
64. See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Simons did not have
a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the record or fruits of his Internet use in
light of [his employer’s] Internet policy.”); see also Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743
(7th Cir. 2002) (upholding private employer’s search of employee’s laptop based on em-
ployer’s policy to search the laptops).
65. See Simons, 206 F.3d at 398 n.8.
66. See, e.g., Muick, 280 F.3d at 743 (“The laptops were [the employer’s] property and it
could attach whatever conditions to their use it wanted to.”); see also Pure Power Boot Camp
v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that em-
ployer’s policy to monitor emails sent on “company equipment” did not extend to emails
sent via third-party services like Google without evidence that the employee utilized the em-
ployer’s computers).
67. See, e.g., Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, No. 06-5754, 2008 WL 6085437, at *4
(D.N.J. July 25, 2008) (finding that an implicit threat of negative employment consequences
could constitute coercion to provide access to employee’s private website); see also Del Riego
et al., supra note 25, at 20 (collecting cases under the federal Stored Communication Act
(SCA) indicating that an employer’s coercion to gain access to an employee’s SNS may void
the employee’s consent to the employer’s access).
68. E.g., United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[The
defendant’s] legitimate expectation of privacy ended when he disseminated posts to his
‘friends’ because those ‘friends’ were free to use the information however they wanted
. . . .”); Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group, Ltd., No. 10 C 7811, 2011 WL 6101949,
at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011) (finding that exposure of information to the public and to
over 1200 followers defeated any expectation of privacy).
69. E.g., Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 369, 372–74
(D.N.J. 2012) (refusing to dismiss the plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim because she “may
have had a reasonable expectation that her Facebook posting would remain private, consid-
ering that she actively took steps to protect her Facebook page from public viewing”); Pietrylo,
2008 WL 6085437, at *7 (“[T]he question of the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs’ expecta-
tions of privacy is a question of fact for the jury to decide.”).
70. Compare E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 434–36 (S.D. Ind.
2010) (social media content partially discoverable), and Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, No. CV
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face with these sorts of issues. Despite this divide, the trend seems
to be that courts will not find a reasonable expectation of privacy in
SNS accounts.71
2. Employer Invasion of Privacy Interest:
Reasonable or Highly Offensive?
If a public employee can make the threshold showing of a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, the issue then becomes whether the
employer’s invasion of that privacy was reasonable.72 According to
O’Connor, this is to be resolved by “balanc[ing] the invasion of the
employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the govern-
ment’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of
the workplace.”73 Public employers have “wide latitude” to enter pri-
vate offices for “work-related, noninvestigatory purposes”74 and to
conduct “an investigation of work-related employee misconduct,”75
as long as the search is both justified at its inception and reasonable
in its scope.76 This latitude also extends to a search of an em-
ployee’s electronic communications made using an employer-
provided pager.77
Based on the O’Connor-Quon line of cases, a public employer’s
ability to search an employee’s SNS account would turn on what
qualifies as a work-related purpose and the importance of that pur-
pose when weighed against the employee’s privacy interests, which
“may be substantial.”78 In Quon, the Court relied heavily on the em-
ployer’s policy of monitoring employee use of computers and other
such resources, of which the employee had notice, in determining
that the search of the employee’s pager communications was rea-
sonable.79 Such policies are commonplace and often apply to
employees’ social media use.80 Consequently, it would seem that as
2012-0307, 2012 WL 6720752 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012) (relevant social media content discov-
erable), with Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388–89 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
(social media content not discoverable).  However, in Tompkins the court based its decision
on a finding that the discovery request was overly broad rather than any expectation of pri-
vacy that the plaintiff had in her SNS account. 278 F.R.D. at 388.
71. See Feuer, supra note 11, at 492–95; Ebnet, supra note 13, at 324.
72. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
73. 480 U.S. 709, 719–20 (1987).
74. Id. at 723.
75. Id. at 725.
76. Id. at 725–26.
77. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 761–62 (2010).
78. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 721.
79. See Quon, 560 U.S. at 761–62.
80. Naito, supra note 26, at 874.
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long as a public employer provides notice to its employees of such a
policy, the employees’ SNS accounts would be fair game for “work-
related purposes.” As regards applicants for public employment, it
is an open question whether employment pre-screening counts as a
non-investigative work-related purpose.81 If so, then notice of the
policy would likely be sufficient to insulate the employer’s actions;
if not, then a search would probably contravene the Fourth
Amendment.
Similar to the reasonableness inquiry in the public-employer con-
text, an intrusion on seclusion tort requires that the privacy
invasion be conducted “in a manner highly offensive to a reasona-
ble person.”82 An intrusion is highly offensive if it involves “an
exceptional kind of prying into another’s private affairs.”83 In decid-
ing whether an intrusion is highly offensive, a court should
consider “the degree of the intrusion, the context, conduct and cir-
cumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder’s
motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the
expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.”84 It is an open ques-
tion as to what kind of intrusion qualifies as highly offensive, but it
is clear that de minimis invasions of privacy, such as “[t]he covert
videotaping of a business conversation among strangers in business
offices,” do not qualify.85
B. Federal and State Legislation
In addition to the common law and constitutional protections
mentioned above, existing federal and state legislation can also pro-
tect applicants’ privacy in the context of SNS accounts. Some states,
responding to the problem that this Note addresses, have passed
laws that ban employers from requiring or requesting access to ap-
plicants’ SNS accounts. Though no such comparable legislation
exists at the federal level, several pre-existing federal statutes, such
as the Stored Communications Act, have been found to apply to
employees’ SNS accounts.
81. See Del Riego et al., supra note 25, at 19.
82. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir.
2012).
83. Id. at 819.
84. Id. (quoting Deteresa v. Am. Broad. Cos., 121 F.3d 460, 465 (9th Cir. 1997)).
85. Id.
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1. Federal Legislation
There are several existing federal statutes that, while not geared
specifically towards protecting the privacy of SNS accounts, can pro-
vide certain safeguards for applicants. Some of the more relevant
laws include the Stored Communications Act,86 the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act,87 the Americans with Disabilities Act,88 and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act.89 In addition, Congress has considered two
pieces of legislation that deal directly with the issue: the Social Net-
work Online Protection Act90 and the Password Protection Act of
2013.91
The Stored Communications Act (SCA)92 is designed to prohibit
unauthorized individuals from “obtain[ing], alter[ing], or pre-
vent[ing] authorized access to a wire or electronic communication
while it is in electronic storage.”93 Although the SCA does not ex-
plicitly cover information on SNS accounts, some courts have
applied it to private messaging services that SNSs provide.94 The
SCA, however, will not protect information on an SNS that is made
publicly available—the information must “be restricted in some
fashion.”95 Enabling privacy settings to restrict access to certain
viewers may be enough to qualify.96 Moreover, at least one court has
found that requiring access to such information as a condition of
employment can be coercive, thus vitiating the user’s
authorization.97
86. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
87. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (2006).
88. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2006).
89. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
90. Social Networking Online Privacy Act, H.R. 537, 113th Cong. (2013). This bill died
upon the expiration of the 113th United States Congress, which had referred it to
committee.
91. Password Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 2077, 113th Cong. (2013). Like SNOPA, this
bill also died upon the expiration of the 113th Congress.
92. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
93. Id. § 2701(a).
94. See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980–82 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (“Recognizing that all three sites provide private messaging or email services, the court
is compelled to apply the voluminous case law cited . . . that establishes that such services
constitute [electronic communication services].”).
95. Id. at 981.
96. See id. at 981–82.
97. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, No. 06-5754, 2009 WL 3128420, at *3 (D.N.J.
Sept. 25, 2009). In this case the access to such information was a condition of continued
employment; whether it is a condition of initial or continued employment is immaterial,
though, as both demonstrate that the employer’s willingness to employ the employee turns
on whether the employee provides access to her SNS.
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The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)98 regulates the activity of
consumer reporting agencies, which provide “consumer credit, per-
sonnel, insurance, and other information.”99 These agencies are
required to adopt “reasonable measures” to ensure the “confidenti-
ality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization” of the information
they provide.100 A consumer reporting agency is “any person
which . . . regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of
assembling or evaluating consumer credit or other information on
consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third
parties.”101 The FCRA thus applies to many different kinds of back-
ground checks, including those “particularly relevant to the social
media pre-employment screening context.”102 But only third-party
reports (i.e., those not conducted by the prospective employer) fall
under the ambit of the FCRA.103
Two anti-discrimination regimes, the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA)104 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII),105
might restrict a prospective employer’s ability to utilize information
contained on an applicant’s SNS account. The ADA prohibits em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of disability, as long as the
applicant “can perform the essential functions of the employment
position” either with or without “reasonable accommodation.”106
Under Title VII, employers cannot discriminate against applicants
on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, or religion.107 An
SNS account may contain information relating to the applicant’s
membership in one of these protected classes, which can create
grounds for a discrimination claim if the applicant is not hired.
Though Title VII is satisfied if the employer’s decision is based on
non-discriminatory reasons, requiring the disclosure of protected
class status during an interview can be evidence of discrimina-
tion.108 Similarly, the ADA bars any inquiry into “the existence,
nature, or severity of a disability”—whether that information is
eventually used to make an employment decision is immaterial.109
98. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (2006).
99. Id. §§ 1681(b).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 1681a(f).
102. Ebnet, supra note 13, at 307.
103. Id.
104. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2006).
105. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
106. Ebnet, supra note 13, at 311.
107. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
108. Ebnet, supra note 13, at 311.
109. Id.
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Thus, a prospective employer may be inviting a lawsuit by demand-
ing access to applicants’ SNS accounts.
In addition to these existing protections, the 113th Congress pro-
posed legislation to address the issue of employee and applicant
SNS account privacy. The Social Networking Online Protection Act
(SNOPA)110 covers employees and applicants111 as well as stu-
dents.112 The employee/applicant provision of SNOPA is similar to
the state laws cited below113 and prohibits employers from request-
ing access to an applicant’s SNS account or from taking adverse
employment action in the event that the applicant refuses to pro-
vide such access.114 The Act would be directly enforceable by the
Secretary of Labor, who would be empowered to bring cases in fed-
eral district court arising out of SNOPA violations.115 The proposed
Password Protection Act of 2013 (PPA)116 also speaks to the issue, as
it would “prohibit employers from forcing prospective or current
employees to provide access to their own private, personal data sys-
tems as a condition of employment” while “retain[ing] employers’
rights to govern access to [SNSs] within office hours and set policies
for employer-operated computer systems and accounts.”117 Both
SNOPA and the PPA died in committee, however. The next Section
will turn to states’ efforts to address this issue with legislation of
their own.
2. State Legislation
Perhaps in an effort to inject some clarity into the law, several
states have passed laws forbidding the practice entirely. As of Janu-
ary 2014, twelve states have passed laws addressing the employer
practice of requesting access to applicants’ SNS accounts: Arkan-
sas,118 California,119 Colorado,120 Illinois,121 Maryland,122
110. Social Networking Online Privacy Act, H.R. 537, 113th Cong. (2013).
111. Id. § 2.
112. Id. §§ 3–4.
113. See infra Part II.B.2.
114. H.R. 537 § 2(a).
115. H.R. 537 § 2(b)(2); see also Gerano, supra note 4, at 679.
116. Password Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 2077, 113th Cong. (2013).
117. Brutocao, supra note 34, at 10 (referring to the PPA of 2012, which is virtually identi-
cal to the PPA of 2013).
118. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124 (2013).
119. CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West 2014). It is worth noting that both O’Connor and Quon
originated in California.
120. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-127 (2013).
121. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/10 (2013), amended by 2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. 98-501 (West).
122. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (LexisNexis 2013).
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Michigan,123 Nevada,124 New Jersey,125 New Mexico,126 Oregon,127
Utah,128 and Washington.129 A representative statute reads as
follows:
An employer shall not do any of the following:
(a) Request an employee or an applicant for employment to
grant access to, allow observation of, or disclose informa-
tion that allows access to or observation of the employee’s
or applicant’s personal internet account.
(b) Discharge, discipline, fail to hire, or otherwise penalize an
employee or applicant for employment for failure to grant
access to, allow observation of, or disclose information
that allows access to or observation of the employee’s or
applicant’s personal internet account.130
These statutes uniformly prohibit employers from requiring ap-
plicants to provide access to their personal SNS accounts, and most
prohibit the employer from taking any adverse action as a result of
an applicant’s failure to provide such access. As of January 2014,
seventeen other states are considering similar legislation.131
Despite the recent state legislation, the state of the law regarding
applicant privacy in SNS accounts is unclear. It remains an open
question whether SNS users can claim a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their accounts, thus leaving applicants vulnerable in both
the public and private sectors. Even if users can claim a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their accounts, it is also unclear whether
requesting access to an applicant’s SNS account would be unreason-
able or highly offensive to a reasonable person. Some existing
federal legislation may or may not be applicable to the practice,
and Congress is having trouble passing its own laws that specifically
prohibit employers from making these demands. Furthermore, the
123. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.273 (LexisNexis 2012).
124. Assemb. 181, 2013 Leg. 77th Sess. (Nev. 2013), available at http://www.leg.state.nv
.us/Session/77th2013/Bills/AB/AB181_EN.pdf.
125. N.J. STAT. ANN. §34:6B-6 (West 2013).
126. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-34 (2013).
127. H.B. 2654, 77th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013), available at https://olis.leg
.state.or.us/liz/2013R1/Measures/Text/HB2654/Enrolled.
128. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-201 (LexisNexis 2013).
129. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.200 (West 2013).
130. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.273 (West 2013).
131. See Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
information-technology/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx#2014.
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proposed federal laws, like the state legislation, frustrate the legiti-
mate interest of employers. From all this uncertainty arises an
imperative to clarify the law and add some stability to the issue. Part
III will offer a means to accomplish that objective: a modified infor-
mation escrow that both protects the substance of applicants’ SNS
accounts and provides employers with information relevant to the
hiring decision.
III. THE WAY FORWARD: AN INFORMATION ESCROW TO
ACCOMMODATE THE NEEDS OF APPLICANTS
AND EMPLOYERS
A. The Inadequacy of Privacy Law and Proposed Solutions
The methods of addressing the question of SNS privacy for appli-
cants can be divided into three basic categories: (1) existing privacy
law (constitutional, statutory, and common law); (2) the passage of
new legislation (both at the state level and at the federal level); and
(3) repurposing existing federal legislation to accommodate the
practice at issue. None of these approaches adequately addresses
both applicants’ desire for privacy and employers’ legitimate need
for relevant information. Privacy law as it stands now is too vague
with regard to the privacy of an employee’s SNS account, and even
where there are concrete standards, they tend to be highly unfavor-
able to the employee.132 State laws, meanwhile, fail entirely to
account for the employers’ needs by forbidding them from request-
ing access to applicants’ SNS accounts in any form. The proposed
federal legislation suffers from the same malady. Finally, the
repurposing of existing federal laws will either require entirely new
legislation, a solution that will suffer from the sluggishness of the
federal legislative process, or leave undesirable gaps in coverage.
The discussion above demonstrates the muddled nature of pri-
vacy law as applied to SNS accounts.133 Courts have not even been
able to agree whether an applicant has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in an SNS account, the prerequisite to asserting any right
against a potential employer. If anything, the current trend seems
to be against finding a reasonable expectation of privacy,134 leaving
applicants at the mercy of the job market and their potential em-
ployers. Compounding the problem is the fact that existing privacy
132. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
133. See supra Part II.A.
134. See Feuer, supra note 11, at 492–95.
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law pertains primarily to physical spaces, such as an office.135 As a
result, it is ill-equipped to deal with privacy problems online and
has not translated well into that context.136 Even if courts were to
find that applicants have reasonable expectations of privacy in their
SNS accounts, the current decisions in privacy law afford no middle
ground between employee privacy interests and employer interests
in learning important information about applicants. Privacy law
does not appropriately accommodate the interests at stake.
Legislation on the subject has also proved incapable of effectively
addressing the problem. State laws passed to date simply bar em-
ployers from requesting access to applicants’ SNS accounts,
period.137 The proposed federal legislation on the topic (SNOPA
and PPA) would also accomplish largely the same objective.138 The
proposed federal laws, however, have struggled to gain traction in
Congress and failed to pass.139 Laws like these are certainly effective
means for protecting applicants’ privacy, but they do not account
for the legitimate needs of employers. The information contained
on applicants’ SNS accounts is highly useful in screening out unde-
sirable candidates (and especially those who may become
liabilities).140 Stripping employers of any access to this relevant in-
formation should only be done if there are no other means of
adequately protecting applicants’ privacy.
Proposals for repurposing existing federal legislation attempt to
strike a balance between applicant privacy and employer interests.
The laws that these proposals utilize, however, are currently insuffi-
cient to reconcile those competing concerns.  The SCA has proved
difficult to apply in the social media context, and the courts that
have found it applicable to information contained on SNS accounts
have only been able to do so via “ ‘legal acrobatics.’ ”141 In fact,
135. See, e.g., O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715–19; see also Del Riego et al., supra note 25, at 18
(“In the United States, privacy law has largely been formulated around the physical realm
. . . .”).
136. Del Riego et al., supra note 25, at 18; see also Ghoshray, supra note 33, at 556
(“[E]nhanced functionalities within cyberspace have reconfigured the way individuals inter-
act online . . . yet the legal protection for such private communications has not evolved
accordingly.”).
137. See supra Part II.B.2.
138. See supra Part II.B.1; see also supra text accompanying notes 110, 115–17.
139. H.R. 537: Social Networking Online Protection Act, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack
.us/congress/bills/113/hr537 (last visited Jan. 6, 2015); H.R. 2077: Password Protection Act of
2013, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2077 (last visited Jan. 6,
2015).  Additionally, the Password Protection Act of 2012, H.R. 5684, 112th Cong. (2012),
died in committee. H.R. 5684 (112th): Password Protection Act of 2012, GOVTRACK.US, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr5684 (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 23–25, 27–29.
141. Feuer, supra note 11, at 499 (citation omitted).
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advocates for the SCA as a solution to the problem of applicant SNS
privacy acknowledge its inability to adapt to social media, choosing
instead to focus on reforming the law rather than applying it in its
current form.142 The SCA will remain “outdated and difficult to ap-
ply to modern technology”143 until it is amended, a process that,
based on the current treatment of SNOPA and PPA, will be slow
and, in all likelihood, unfruitful.144
The FCRA’s major limitation is that it only applies to searches
conducted by third parties, meaning that employers who conduct
pre-screening in-house are exempt from its restrictions.145 Conse-
quently, for the FCRA to serve as a meaningful limitation on
employers’ ability to search applicants’ SNS accounts, third-party
searches must be mandatory.146 Furthermore, even if the law re-
quired that third parties conduct searches of applicants’ SNS
accounts, the FCRA does not limit the information to which the
third party and, consequently, the employer, may gain access.
Rather, the FCRA requires only that the employer obtain the appli-
cant’s consent prior to conducting the search147 and notify the
applicant if adverse action is taken as a result of the search.148 As
long as those requirements are met, the third party has access to
whatever information is publicly available (including substantive
content from the applicant’s SNS account) and can transmit that
information to the employer. At the same time, the FCRA does not,
by itself, authorize access to that information on an SNS account
that the applicant has protected from public view. The search is
thus both overly invasive—in that the employer can gain access to
any of the applicant’s available substantive SNS content—and insuf-
ficiently informative—in that it does not enable the examination of
all potentially pertinent information contained on an SNS account.
In other words, the employer has access to information other than
that which is necessary to effectively pre-screen an applicant, but
not to all the information likely to be relevant. Hence, the FCRA is
an inadequate solution to the problem.
Title VII and the ADA are also insufficient to address the issue.
These statutes forbid employers from gaining access to information
142. See id. at 499–503; see also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“[T]he existing statutory framework [of the SCA] is ill-suited to address modern
forms of communication . . . .”).
143. Feuer, supra note 11, at 511.
144. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
145. Ebnet, supra note 13, at 314, 328–29.
146. Ebnet, supra note 13, at 329.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(2)(A)(i).
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regarding an applicant’s membership in certain protected clas-
ses;149 they do not reach any private information outside of that. As
long as an employer’s search of an applicant’s SNS account does
not yield information regarding such membership, neither Title VII
nor the ADA would pose a barrier. Consequently, these statutes do
not sufficiently protect applicants’ privacy. On the other hand, em-
ployers considering a search of an applicant’s SNS account can
never be sure whether the account will reveal information regard-
ing the applicant’s membership in a protected class. In an effort to
avoid potential discrimination lawsuits, an employer may choose to
forego any review of the applicants’ SNS accounts. As a result, Title
VII and the ADA also do not appropriately account for employers’
needs in pre-screening applicants. Instead, a different approach is
needed, one that maximizes both employers’ and applicants’ ability
to get what they want.
B. The Best of Both Worlds: A Modified Information Escrow
Although the current state of the law does not offer an adequate
solution to the problem of applicant SNS privacy, there is a system
that will serve the legitimate interests of both applicants and em-
ployers. The solution is a modified information escrow that will
simultaneously provide employers with the information they need
and protect the substance of applicants’ SNS accounts150 from the
prying eyes of potential employers.
1. Information Escrows and Adaptation to the
Employer/Applicant Context
An information escrow is “a mechanism of conditional, intermedi-
ated communication” that “allow[s] the user to deposit information
into [the] escrow lockbox with instructions . . . that the information
only be released to prespecified recipients under prespecified cir-
cumstances.”151 The escrow necessarily involves a third party (the
escrow agent), but seeks to limit or eliminate third-party discretion
149. See supra text accompanying notes 104–09.
150. By “the substance of applicants’ SNS accounts,” “substantive content of SNS ac-
counts,” and similar phrases, I mean the content located on such accounts that forms the
basis for the conclusions employers seek to draw about the applicant. Such content includes
photos, wall posts, status updates, tweets, and the like.
151. Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows, 111 MICH. L. REV. 145, 150 (2012).
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via the limiting conditions placed upon the release of the informa-
tion.152 Some common forms of information escrows are
commitment escrows, into which the depositor places “embarrass-
ing or incriminating information that will be released if the
depositor fails to keep a commitment,”153 and posthumous escrows,
from which deposited information is released after a predeter-
mined period of time following the depositor’s death.154
Interestingly, the two examples just cited serve contrary purposes:
the depositor for a commitment escrow hopes that the information
deposited will not be released, instead using the threat of release as
an incentive to adhere to a certain course of action in a form of self-
imposed blackmail; the depositor for a posthumous escrow, on the
other hand, is ensuring that the information eventually will be re-
leased.155 Information escrows are thus capable of adaptation to
serve different ends. This flexibility gives these escrows a leg up over
the rigid mechanisms mentioned previously.156
The information escrow for potential employees would require
the applicant to “deposit” her SNS account password(s) with the
“escrow agent,” a third party acting on behalf of the employer, who
would then search the SNS account for information relevant to the
employer’s hiring decision.157 In its traditional form as described
above, the information escrow would do little to assist in this pro-
cess. If the depositor (in this case, the applicant) could set the
conditions of the release of information, then it is unlikely that the
employer would ever receive any information at all, let alone any
useful information. Consequently, in this context it would be the
employer setting the conditions of release via a list of “red flags”
provided to the escrow agent. On this list would be activities and
information that the employer considers relevant to the hiring deci-
sion (e.g., drinking, drug use, and negative comments regarding
152. Id.
153. Id. at 151.
154. Id. at 153.
155. Id.
156. See supra Part III.A.
157. This is the method by which the information escrow would have to operate at the
present time. A far more convenient method would involve the SNS itself providing a func-
tion that would enable the escrow agent to view the private information without the applicant
having to provide her password. For example, an SNS could create a user category for escrow
agents such that, utilizing proper authentication procedures, the escrow agent would simply
be granted access to the private parts of the applicant’s SNS account without the cumber-
some intermediate step of providing the escrow agent with a password and its accompanying
difficulties (addressed more fully in Part III.B.2, infra). Legislatures cannot mandate that
SNSs provide such an option, which is why the proposed escrow is structured the way it is. If
this approach is adopted, however, perhaps the SNSs would create the escrow agent function-
ality on their own.
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employers). If, in the course of the search, the escrow agent discov-
ers any of these red flags, the agent will indicate the presence of
that information, for instance by checking a box next to the appro-
priate red flag on the list of relevant hiring criteria. Once the
search is completed, the escrow agent then returns the red flag list
to the employer.
This modified information escrow recalibrates the budget of
available information, so to speak, between the applicant’s privacy
interest and the employer’s interest in relevant information be-
cause it provides the employer with all (or most) of the information
she needs to make an educated hiring decision while simultane-
ously protecting the substance of the applicant’s SNS account from
the employer’s prying eyes. To illustrate this point, imagine that the
achievement of each actor’s goal158 is measured on a scale of zero
(not at all achieved) to one hundred (completely achieved). In a
state that bans the practice of requesting access to an applicant’s
SNS account, the applicant keeps all of his SNS information private
(one hundred) and the employer gets none of the information she
wants (zero) for a total of one hundred. By using a modified infor-
mation escrow, the employee is able to keep virtually all of the
substantive content of his SNS account private (say, somewhere be-
tween eighty and ninety), and the employer would also have access
to nearly all of the information that she wants (also between eighty
and ninety) for a total score of somewhere north of 160.159 In this
way, the information escrow does not balance the interests of the two
parties so much as it expands the available framework within which
to operate.
This result can be analogized to the system of credit reporting.
Based on an applicant’s “bill-paying history, including late collec-
tion actions,” credit reporting agencies provide employers with a
credit score reflecting that history.160 As a result, the employer re-
ceives the information relevant to the hiring decision (e.g., that the
applicant has, for the most part, handled her finances well) without
learning the private details (e.g., that the applicant did not pay a
few credit card bills on time) that form the basis of that informa-
tion. In the same way, the modified information escrow would
158. The applicant’s goal is to keep as much private information private as possible, while
the employer’s goal is to obtain as much information relevant to the hiring decision as
possible.
159. These figures are, of course, speculative. The budget of available information will be
successfully recalibrated, however, as long as each actor achieves better than half of his goal
(i.e., better than a score of fifty)—because the total score of a ban will always be one hun-
dred, any score above that improves the net outcome of the system.
160. Ebnet, supra note 13, at 312–13.
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provide employers with pertinent information (e.g., that the appli-
cant drinks socially) without seeing the source of the information
(e.g., that embarrassing picture of the applicant chugging a beer
during spring break in college) that the applicant would prefer to
keep private.
While the modified information escrow would do much to pro-
tect an applicant’s privacy, it necessarily does less than an outright
ban. This means that some measure of applicant privacy will be sac-
rificed to the gain of employers. Applicants will likely be unhappy
with this solution, since they will be less protected. But unlike the
existing state bans and the proposed federal bans on the practice of
requesting SNS account access, this solution has the advantage of
acknowledging that there are two relevant actors engaged in this
transaction (the applicant and the employer) and that each has le-
gitimate interests at stake. So, while it is true that this solution does
not work out as well for applicants, the marginal loss to their pri-
vacy is more than offset by the tremendous gain for employers,
whose needs should also be taken into account.
In addition to the recalibration of the informational budget, this
system would prevent the employer from gaining access to poten-
tially controversial information that should not have any bearing on
the hiring decision. For example, perhaps an applicant enjoys a
particular singer or genre of music that the employer finds offen-
sive and the applicant discloses that interest on her SNS account. If
the employer were to view the applicant’s SNS account directly or
otherwise gain access to its substantive content, that information
may, consciously or unconsciously, influence the employer’s ulti-
mate decision. Using the modified information escrow, on the
other hand, the employer would never access that information and
as a result, could not hold it against the applicant.
Another benefit of using a modified information escrow to con-
duct searches of applicants’ SNS accounts is that, because the
escrow agent is a third party, the FCRA would apply. Hence, the
information escrow would achieve all the protection offered by the
FCRA in addition to its own inherent safeguards. As mentioned
above, the FCRA mandates that the applicant give consent to the
search and also that the applicant be notified if the search results in
a negative hiring decision.161 This latter requirement is especially
important in this context because it would be valuable evidence in a
potential lawsuit to enforce an applicant’s rights under a contract
161. See supra text accompanying notes 147–48.
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creating the information escrow or to recover damages for a breach
thereof.162
2. Avoiding Abuses and Answering Objections
Although the use of modified information escrows is a promising
solution, it is not perfect—the potential for abuse would require
additional regulation. The applicant, employer, and escrow agent
can all subvert the system, thereby destroying the advantages that
these information escrows are designed to secure. Additionally,
there are several objections that might be leveled at the use of this
system. While not exhaustive, this Section attempts to address at
least the major abuses and objections that accompany the proposal.
The most obvious means to address potential abuses is to require
that the information escrow be created by a contract between the
applicant, the employer, and the escrow agent. This contract would
delineate the rights and responsibilities of each party and provide a
cause of action if any party breached an obligation. A comprehen-
sive contract would effectively protect against most of the potential
abuses to which these information escrows might be vulnerable.
Such a contract would also be cost-effective: once standardized, it
could be reproduced and used for all applications.
Applicants will be tempted to conceal as much of their personal
information as possible. An applicant might lie and say that she
does not have an SNS account, or she may have multiple SNS ac-
counts, only one of which she discloses to the employer. This
particular kind of abuse is difficult to address because it is not clear
how the employer would discover that the applicant has not been
truthful. A partial solution would be to include in the contract an
obligation, owed by the applicant to the employer, to provide the
escrow agent with passwords to all of the applicant’s personal SNS
accounts. The clause should also indicate that the applicant’s fail-
ure to abide by this requirement would, if the applicant is hired,
constitute grounds for termination once discovered. This would
provide a strong incentive for a serious applicant to be forthcoming
regarding her SNS accounts.
Employers, on the other hand, may try to use their control over
the escrow conditions to obtain information that goes beyond the
scope of a reasonable search. Some criteria, such as drug use, would
likely be universally accepted as relevant to the hiring decision, just
as other criteria, like taste in music, would generally be considered
162. See infra Part III.B.2.
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irrelevant. Between those extremes, however, is where the difficulty
lies. Because different employers value different characteristics,
what might be a red flag for one employer would not necessarily
offend another. A standardized list of criteria would thus be of little
utility, meaning that employers would be free to craft their own
lists. The lack of a definitive list of criteria against which to measure
would, to an extent, leave applicants vulnerable to a particular em-
ployer’s idiosyncratic views of desirable employee characteristics.
This problem could be mitigated by (1) including in the escrow
contract a duty for the employer to request only information re-
garding criteria that bear a “significant nexus”163 to a hiring
decision and (2) requiring public disclosure of the list of criteria to
be used at the time that the job is posted (and an obligation to
provide the same list to each applicant prior to the creation of the
escrow). The first requirement would both limit the employer’s
ability to request information and allow for some flexibility by per-
mitting employers to decide what information is important for
applicants in their business or industry. The “significant nexus”
standard164 is well-suited to this inquiry—it is less deferential than a
“reasonably relevant” standard,165 but more flexible than an “essen-
tial” standard.166 The second requirement would serve two
functions. First, it would give the applicant notice of the informa-
tion sought from her SNS account, thereby allowing the applicant
to either provide informed consent or refuse and withdraw her ap-
plication. Second, it would act as a check on the employer’s
impulse to search for extraneous information because the employer
would have to either disclose her interest in such information,
which would disincentivize application, or operate outside the
bounds of the list provided, which would breach the escrow
contract.
163. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 759 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (dis-
cussing a “significant nexus” test in the context of the Clean Water Act).
164. Admittedly, the “significant nexus” test originated in the context of the Clean Water
Act, but its reasoning can be easily adapted: in the same way that wetlands possess a signifi-
cant nexus with navigable waters because they are “ ‘integral parts of the aquatic
environment,’ ” id. at 779, employers’ criteria will bear a significant nexus to the hiring deci-
sion if they are “integral” thereto. There will also have to be a reasonableness component to
the inquiry to ensure that employers cannot utilize irrelevant criteria simply because such
criteria are, from the employer’s perspective, integral to the hiring decision. A requirement
that the criteria be objectively reasonable should alleviate this concern.
165. See F.T.C. v. Carter, 636 F.2d 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that the “reasonably
relevant” standard is satisfied so long as the information sought is “ ‘not plainly irrelevant’” to
the purpose motivating the search).
166. See Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff’s Dept., 227 F.3d 719, 726 (6th Cir. 2000)
(defining “essential function” as a  “fundamental” duty of the employment position).
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The primary concern with regard to the escrow agent would be
the appropriate use of the information to which the agent is given
access. As an initial matter, requiring applicants to disclose their
passwords constitutes a security risk because many people use the
same password for different things, such as email and online bank-
ing.167 To avoid this risk, the agent should instruct the applicant to
change her password to one assigned by the agent prior to the
search. This will enable the agent to access the account temporarily
and once the search is completed, the applicant can return to her
original password.168 Another potential abuse is the risk of the es-
crow agent using information obtained as a result of the search for
personal gain. This issue could be addressed by a clause in the es-
crow contract forbidding such action. Finally, the escrow contract
would also have to include a duty of confidentiality that prohibits
the agent from disclosing the information contained on the ac-
count to anyone other than the employer. That duty should also
prohibit the agent from disclosing more information than neces-
sary to complete the red flag list. Utilizing hiring standards for
escrow agents similar to those of credit reporting agencies may also
alleviate confidentiality concerns.
In addition to the possible abuses described above, this solution
is subject to other criticisms. Perhaps the most significant objection
is the potential cost of implementing such a system. There are three
major components in assessing this cost: (1) the requisite changes
in the law; (2) the creation of escrow agencies to conduct the
searches; and (3) the cost of the searches to employers. Implement-
ing the escrows in states that have banned employer SNS searches
will require a change in the law. While a full repeal of the law would
permit the use of modified escrows, the ideal solution is to create
an exception to the ban allowing their use. The benefit of this ex-
ception is that the escrows would be the only means for employers
to carry out these searches, thereby guaranteeing that employers
would either use them and gain the attendant benefits or be unable
to conduct any such searches at all. The political cost of such an
amendment would be less than a full repeal because the exception
167. See Carrie-Ann Skinner, One-Third Use a Single Password for Everything, PCWORLD (Mar.
11, 2009, 11:10 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/161078/one_third_use_same_pass
word.html (reporting that approximately thirty-three percent of Internet users utilize the
same password for multiple online applications).
168. The risks of the escrow agent misusing the applicant’s password or of the password
otherwise being exposed to non-authorized users only exists in a system that requires the
applicant’s password to gain access to the private content of the applicant’s SNS account. If
there were an alternative means for the escrow agent to access that content, the need for this
elaborate system would be obviated. See, e.g., supra note 157.
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would be narrow and it would benefit employers while minimizing
the intrusion on applicants’ privacy. Consequently, any loss of polit-
ical support from those applicants adversely affected should be
offset, at least to some extent, by a corresponding increase in good-
will from employers.
The second cost component is the creation of an entirely new
industry of SNS escrow agents to conduct these searches. This ob-
stacle, however, is less daunting than it initially appears. For one
thing, there are already agencies that perform similar kinds of
work,169 meaning that hopeful SNS escrow agents would not have to
reinvent the wheel, so to speak. Furthermore, there is minimal ex-
pertise required to conduct a search of an SNS profile, so recruiting
escrow agents should not pose much difficulty, and there will be
virtually no training costs. As long as there is a demand for the
modified escrows, there will be an incentive for companies to enter
the market to provide the service.
Implementing the escrow system will also impose additional costs
on employers. One of the major benefits of SNS research for em-
ployers is that it can be conducted in-house for little to no cost;170
requiring that employers outsource the work eliminates that incen-
tive. But denying employers the ability to conduct any form of SNS
search also imposes a cost by precluding the most informed possi-
ble hiring decision. Amending the ban on employer SNS searches
to exempt modified escrows would allow employers to engage in a
cost-benefit analysis to determine whether to utilize an escrow in
the hiring process. The cost would thus be imposed only on those
willing to bear it, and it would likely be offset by the benefit ob-
tained by those employers who choose to incur it.
Though the actual cost per applicant of the escrow system is nec-
essarily speculative at this point, it seems unlikely that it would be
prohibitively expensive. Some background checks are indeed
costly—for example, a Secret-level security clearance check runs be-
tween $210 and $272, while a Top Secret-level check costs almost
$4,000.171 A Secret-level security clearance, however, is a highly in-
tensive process that involves “automated and manual checks of
criminal history, terrorist activities, credit, and foreign activities and
169. Some headhunting companies utilize SNS profiles to match the owners of those
profiles with employers seeking applicants. See, e.g., What We Do, SOCIAL MEDIA SEARCH, http:/
/www.socialmediasearch.co.uk/what-we-do/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2014).
170. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
171. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, SUITABILITY AND SECURITY PROCESSES REVIEW REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT FEBRUARY 2014 3 (2014), available at http://fas.org/sgp/othergov/omb/
suitsec-2014.pdf.
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influence.”172 Where warranted, “additional checks, including inter-
views and other more manual efforts, are conducted.”173 An SNS
search will not involve such herculean efforts and may more readily
be compared to a credit report, which costs significantly less.174 In
sum, these escrows will cost employers money, but it is unlikely that
the costs will of such a magnitude as to render the system
unworkable.
Applicants may object that the information requested is private
and should not be considered in making a hiring decision. Though
the information is not public in the sense that anyone can access it,
the information is at least partially public because it is exposed to a
portion of the public (i.e., those people to whom the applicant has
granted access). The applicant has thus assumed the risk that the
permitted viewers might disclose that information. In an individual
capacity, the applicant may be willing to accept this risk. If the ap-
plicant is hired, however, she becomes a representative of her
employer. At that point, the “private” information on the appli-
cant’s SNS account would no longer implicate only her, but would
also reflect on the employer if one of those permitted viewers dis-
closed that information. It is fair for an employer to know whether
her representatives (i.e., employees) are disseminating improper in-
formation on the Internet. Depriving the employer of access to this
information would allow the applicant to decide for the employer
what risks the employer should assume.
The next objection, from the employers, is that the information
escrow approach will be limited by the pre-selected criteria and
thus not account for “I know it when I see it”175 types of informa-
tion. This objection might refer to either of two kinds of
information: ambiguous information that may or may not be a red
flag, or information whose relevance to the hiring process does not
occur to the employer unless she is presented with it. The first cate-
gory deals with discretion—when faced with ambiguous
information, either the employer or the escrow agent will have to
make a judgment call. Allowing the employer to instruct the escrow
agent to either disclose or not when confronted with such informa-
tion would likely resolve this issue in most cases. The second
category seems analogous to the idiosyncratic preferences, such as
172. Id. at 2.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Employment Credit Report, PROFORMA SCREENING SOLUTIONS, http://www.pro
formascreening.com/employment-screening/personal-identity/ (last visited July 8, 2014)
(charging $8.50 for an employment credit report).
175. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (describing “I
know it when I see it” in the context of obscenity law).
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an applicant’s taste in music, that are of questionable relevance in
the hiring process. If the criterion is truly pertinent, then it will
probably come to the employer’s attention at some point, at which
time the employer can amend the red flag list for future use. If the
omitted criterion never comes to the employer’s attention, then it
likely does not have a significant nexus to the hiring process. Either
way, simple experience using the information escrow over time
should resolve this objection.
CONCLUSION
The explosion of social media use has in many ways redefined
the ways in which we communicate. SNSs can help people stay in
touch with one another and can serve as creative outlets for individ-
ual expression and community sharing. But the widespread use of
SNSs has also created problems, among them the issue addressed in
this Note: how to handle employers’ desire to use the information
that applicants post online to make hiring decisions. On the one
hand, applicants are justified in their reticence to expose private
information to people with whom they would prefer not to share it.
On the other hand, employers are equally justified in trying to ac-
quire as much relevant information about an applicant as they can
to ensure the most informed hiring decision possible. The current
legal framework addressing this issue fails to solve the dilemmas be-
cause it does not sufficiently account for both parties’ legitimate
interests.
This Note puts forth a solution that accommodates both appli-
cants’ desire for privacy and employers’ need for information in a
way that would maximize the system’s net output, measured by the
parties’ respective values on privacy and access to relevant informa-
tion. A modified information escrow protects applicants’ privacy
interests in the substantive content of their SNS accounts while at
the same time providing to employers the information from those
accounts that is relevant to the hiring decision—and only that infor-
mation. While this solution may not be ideal for either party, it is a
necessary compromise.

